In the previous posting on this subject we looked at the necessity for any type of organized
human activity to have clear and understandable rules in order to be just or
even functional. There must, in fact, be
a recognition and implementation of the democratic ideal.
. . . and that
creates a problem. What do we mean by
“the democratic ideal”?
Alexis de Tocqueville |
Well, in the
first place, it means respect for the dignity of the human person, which first
and foremost means respecting each individual’s natural rights of life,
liberty, and private property. In the
second place it means . . . what we mean by “human dignity,” of which
sovereignty is an essential aspect.
. . . and that
creates a problem. What do we mean by
“sovereignty”?
In a word, power.
In a few more
words, in this context we mean “freedom
from external control; autonomy.”
Unfortunately, in
the western tradition of liberal democracy — which is the “democratic ideal” to
which we refer — there are three completely different things that “liberal
democracy” can mean! To make matters
worse, they all use pretty much the same terms and even arguments.
It is therefore
critical in any discussion of democracy to know the context and the meaning of
specific terms within that context. For
our purposes, and drawing on the analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (1835, 1840), the
three contexts are:
Making people equal. |
·
European
Liberal Democracy. In the European
or French tradition of liberal democracy, out of which we get socialism and
communism, the people as a whole is sovereign.
Individuals only have such rights as are deemed expedient or beneficial
for the greater good. There is no such
thing as an inalienable or natural right in the traditional sense, for all
rights can be taken away if those in control of the community or state deem it
necessary or desirable.
·
English
Liberal Democracy. In the English
tradition of liberal democracy, out of which we get capitalism, an élite among the people is
sovereign. In theory, everyone has
inalienable and natural rights, but only the chosen few have the special
ability to exercise them — which is to say that those who lack the special
ability to exercise rights don’t actually have rights. The élite
may permit others outside the group of the chosen ones to exercise rights if
deemed expedient or beneficial for the greater good. There is no such thing as an inalienable or
natural right in the traditional sense, for all rights can be taken away if
those in control of the community or state deem it necessary or desirable.
Not perfect, but better than the alternatives. |
·
American
Liberal Democracy. In the American
tradition of liberal democracy (of which there does not appear to be any
surviving example in the world today, even in America*), the individual human
person is sovereign. While never
achieved in practice, the ideal is that every human being has the same natural
rights and the same** capacity to acquire and develop virtue. Each human being therefore should have the
same opportunity and access to the means to exercise all rights. Thus, everyone has the same inalienable and
absolute rights as everyone else, but at the same time, the exercise of all rights
must be strictly limited so that no one’s exercise of a right harms anyone else
thereby.
Hialaire Belloc, The Servile State (1912) |
*America got off
to a bad start by limiting those human beings considered “persons,” i.e., those with rights. Ironically, the effort to correct the problem
and extend personality to every human being resulted in a transformation from
American liberal democracy to a bizarre combination of English and European
liberal democracy. This entailed the
shift away from the sovereignty of the human person and a move to the sovereignty
of an élite (capitalism) and of the
people as a whole (socialism). The
English and the European versions of liberal democracy are still fighting it
out as things drift into the Servile State that is neither capitalism nor
socialism, but the worst of both worlds.
See William Winslow Crosskey, Politics
and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953) and Hilaire
Belloc, The Servile State (1912).
**“Analogously
complete” if you want to be strictly accurate.
“Same” is not really the correct term.
It is interesting
to note that European and English type liberal democracy are so different from
the American type that the popes in their social encyclicals wouldn’t even use
the terms liberal or democracy except with extreme caution and many
caveats. This was presumably to prevent
confusion of Catholic social teaching with either capitalism and socialism . .
. but the confusion happened anyway, probably because so many people are
convinced that nothing except capitalism and socialism are even possible.
William Cobbett critiqued English democracy. |
In any event,
what concerns us in this discussion is the role of regulation in each of the
three types of liberal democracy. How
the need for regulation in any kind of social order manifests itself gives a
good indication of the type of liberal democracy in place in a particular
society:
European Liberal Democracy. Regulation is for the benefit of the
abstraction of the people as a whole.
Individual rights are irrelevant.
If rights nominally assigned to or held by any individual or group get
in the way of what those who control the collective want, the rights,
individual or group, or both, are neutralized or eliminated.
English Liberal Democracy. Regulation is for the benefit of the élite.
Only rights held by the élite
are relevant. If rights nominally
assigned to or held by any individual or group get in the way of the élite, the rights, individual or group,
or both, are neutralized or eliminated.
American Liberal Democracy. Regulation is for the benefit of every
individual. Group rights are only
relevant if delegated from individuals and must be regulated as such, i.e., no regulation may give an unfair
advantage to any individual or group, or cause harm to any individual, group,
or the common good as a whole.
As suggested
above, regulation of the type found in American liberal democracy is currently
not applied anywhere in the world.
Neither are the European and English types found in their pure form,
having in most cases merged into the Servile State, although that has taken a form somewhat
different from what Belloc envisioned.
John Paul II, democracy presupposes private property. |
It is,
nevertheless, the State’s job in all three forms of liberal democracy to care
for the common good and to be the backup to enforce contracts and regulations
in conformity with the rights of individuals and the demands of the common
good. These terms are, of course,
somewhat vaguely defined when it comes to the European and English forms of
liberal democracy. In the American form
— again, not found anywhere today — the job of the State (construed as a "social tool") can be more clearly
defined:
These general observations also apply to the role of the State in the economic sector. Economic activity,
especially the activity of a market economy, cannot be conducted in an
institutional, juridical or political vacuum. On the contrary, it presupposes
sure guarantees of individual freedom and private property, as well as a stable
currency and efficient public services. Hence the principle task of the State
is to guarantee this security, so that those who work and produce can enjoy the
fruits of their labours and thus feel encouraged to work efficiently and
honestly. The absence of stability, together with the corruption of public
officials and the spread of improper sources of growing rich and of easy
profits deriving from illegal or purely speculative activities, constitutes one
of the chief obstacles to development and to the economic order. (Centesimus Annus, § 48.)
That is useful,
of course, but we still need to define the principles that should guide not
merely the role of the State, but of all participants in the economic process,
for the State is, in a sense, the least important actor on the economic stage
in a justly structured social order.
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