In classic
Thomist philosophy, as we saw in the previous posting on this subject, the four natural virtues are temperance, fortitude,
prudence, and — above all — justice.
According to Aristotle (and thus Aquinas), the capacity to acquire and
develop these virtues is built into human nature. No one is human without the capacity to
acquire and develop these virtues, for that capacity (which is the good common
to every human being) is what defines human beings as human beings.
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| Not virtue, but the capacity for virtue. |
It is important
to note that it is not having virtue that defines human beings as human
beings, but having the capacity for virtue. Were it otherwise, infants and others who
developed vice instead of virtue, or who did not have enough virtue or the kinds
of virtue to satisfy some critics, would not be considered human. That, of course, is impossible, for it would
violate the first principle of reason to say that someone can be non-human or partially
human based on the degree and kind of virtue he or she possesses.
In its “negative”
statement, the first principle of reason is the “law of (non) contradiction”:
nothing can both “be” and “not be” at the same time under the same
conditions. Thus, to say that someone is
partially human — i.e., part human and part non-human — is a
contradiction in terms. It thereby
violates the first principle of reason.
Nor does this
change when the matter of degree is potential humanness versus actual humanness. A potential human being is as fully human as
an actual human being; a fetus, an infant, a child, an adult, and an elderly
individual are all fully human, and are human in the same way, as all other
humans.
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| Eventually the instigator gets taken down, too. . . . |
That, in fact, is
the “positive” statement of the first principle of reason: the “law of
identity”: that which is true is as true, and is true in the same way, as
everything else that is true. Someone
can be a more fully developed human being, but no one can be more or less fully
human than anyone else, or he or she isn’t human at all — and it also violates
reason to say that a human being can be non-human at the same time under the
same conditions. . . .
Evidently, when
reason is violated, there is something of a domino effect.
Now, the reason
for this discussion is to make it clear that the capacity for the natural
virtues of temperance, fortitude, prudence, and justice defines human beings as
human beings. This is necessary, for we
must understand the natural virtues before we can go on to the supernatural
virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
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| Supernatural is above the natural. |
This is because
where the capacity for the natural virtues is part of human nature (hence
“natural”), the capacity for the supernatural virtues — at least according to
Aquinas — is infused into human nature by God as a free gift to every human
being (Aristotle had different thoughts on the subject that we need not go into
here). The capacity for the supernatural
virtues is thus “above nature” or super-natural.
The distinction
between natural virtue and supernatural virtue is important in Thomism. Because it is “above nature,” supernatural
virtue absolutely requires the existence of natural virtue as its
foundation. Having supernatural virtue
without natural virtue is like having a roof without a house. A house without a roof is incomplete, just as
justice without charity is incomplete, but a roof without a house — charity
without justice — is completely meaningless, even counterproductive, for what
use is a roof that doesn’t cover anything?
It’s rather like Alice’s grin without a cat.
Unfortunately, charity
and justice have been confused for the past two hundred years. This has been a disaster, as it changes not
merely the meaning and purpose of life, but the definition of human being.
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| John Paul I: Charity no substitute for justice. |
In justice, we
can only punish people for what they have done, not for what they might do, for
their characteristics, or because we find them inconvenient. This is because all human beings are equally
human, and all have the same capacity to acquire and develop virtue, i.e.,
to become more fully human, and thus all have equal natural rights to life,
liberty, and private property. All human
beings are thus automatically persons by nature, “natural persons” with
inherent rights to life, liberty, and private property.
Someone is
important and has dignity not merely for what he or she has become, but
for what he or she can become.
Charity fulfills justice, it does not replace it. Paradoxically (and to oversimplify), charity
looks to results while justice looks to opportunity. In classical philosophy and theology, then,
what is important is access to the opportunity and means to become virtuous,
not necessarily acquiring and developing one’s full capacity for virtue. All human beings are in that sense “works in
progress.”
That is why
charity fulfills justice. Justice
demands that everyone have equal access to the opportunity and means to become
virtuous. It does not demand that people
actually be virtuous. Yes, people
should be punished — appropriately and judiciously — when they commit vicious
acts, but not because they have a lack of virtue. They should only be punished if their vicious
acts cause material and provable harm.
You can’t punish someone for being greedy, but you can punish someone
for stealing out of greed — as long as you understand that you are punishing
him or her for the theft, not for being greedy!
When someone has
full access to the opportunity and means to become virtuous and fails — for
whatever reason — only then does charity step in to make up where justice may
have been lacking. Again, charity does
not in this way invalidate or replace justice, but completes or fulfills
justice.
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| Yeah, he said it, too. |
This is why
charity and social justice are often confused these days. Charity is concerned not with the failure of
justice, but its completion or perfection.
Social justice is concerned with the failure of justice. If justice fails to function due to flaws in
the system, the proper response is to organize in social justice to correct the
flaw in the system so that justice functions properly, not to try and provide
what justice should have or would have provided had it been operating properly.
Yes, charity must
often provide for people until social justice takes effect and corrects the
system. That, however, is a temporary
expedient until justice can once again function. It is not a permanent solution.
All of this is
reversed when we redefine charity and justice, and assume that the meaning and
purpose of life is individual or social betterment. Whether one is a capitalist or a socialist,
mere material betterment is not the meaning and purpose of life.
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| Something seems to have gotten lost in translation. . . . |
There is nothing
wrong with becoming materially better, of course, but it must be done in a way
that does not violate the rights of anyone.
The end does not justify the means, even if you call what you’re doing
justice, charity, or social justice. “Charity”
that violates justice is not true charity, while “social justice” that violates
justice and charity is simply wrong.
Thus, by defining
human beings by their effectiveness in carrying out individual or social
betterment (as the capitalists and socialists do) we end up defining human
beings by the virtues or vices they acquire.
Someone is what he or she is, and that means you can justly eliminate
anyone who does not measure up to some predetermined standard you have set.
Nowhere is this
seen more graphically than in abortion.
A woman may have a right to her own body (we’re not debating that), but
she does not have a right to anyone else’s.
A potential human is as fully human as an actual human, and therefore
has the same capacity to become more fully human.
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| Yes, but what's your economic agenda? |
That being the
case, both potential humans and actual humans are natural persons and have the
same natural rights, even though they may not have the capacity to exercise
them, any more than a blind man can exercise his right to drive a car or a
woman in a coma can vote. In Roe v.
Wade (1973), however, the United States Supreme Court claimed that the
Court did not know whether or not a fetus is a human being, but that it is not
a “person” as that term is meant in the U.S. Constitution.
This is simply
bad jurisprudence as well as execrable logic, as the U.S. Constitution takes
for granted that all human beings are automatically persons with rights. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in part to
strengthen this point, but was nullified in 1873 by the Court to enhance its
own power.
This brings us
almost full circle back to our original question: does the State have the duty
to provide for everyone’s needs — making everyone a “mere creature of the State”
and a person by State fiat — or are human beings persons with natural rights,
and the State’s primary duty is not to care for people, but to make it possible
for them to care for themselves?
That is what we
will look at in our next posting on this subject.
#30#
