As noted previously on this blog, the differences with
neo-distributism on specifics like money, credit, banking, finance, size of
enterprises, and the act of social justice are far too numerous to list. We should note, however, that the concept of
distributive justice, understandably vague in classic distributism due to the
confusion with social justice and charity, is completely transformed in
neo-distributism.
In neo-distributism, “distributive justice” is redefined as
distribution on the basis of need, a redefinition that completely overturns the
Aristotelian-Thomist concept of distributive justice. There appears to be no substantive difference
in neo-distributism between social justice, distributive justice, or forced
charity.
This results in ceding overwhelming power to the State. This is necessary due to the fact that in the
neo-distributist view, the State is responsible not for the common good
properly defined, but the common good redefined as the aggregate of individual
goods.
This makes the State responsible for providing for everyone’s
individual wants and needs, not for maintaining the institutional environment
within which people meet their own needs through their own efforts. Productive people are thereby forced to work
for the benefit of the unproductive. As
Karl Marx described this arrangement in his 1875 “Critique of the Gotha
Program,” the principle governing economic life is summarized as “From each
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.”
Since this abolishes private property in both labor and
capital, it is contrary to nature. Being
contrary to nature, it is contrary to common sense, and thus to both classic
distributism and the Just Third Way.
The major difference, however, between the Just Third Way
and classic distributism on the one hand, and neo-distributism on the other, is
on a fundamental principle of reality.
The Just
Third Way is based on the Aristotelian-Thomist understanding of the natural
law. That is, the natural law is based
on what can be observed about human nature.
The natural law is therefore discernible by “human reason by its own
natural force and light.” (Humani Generis,
§ 2.) Right/good is what reason
determines is consistent with human nature.
Wrong/evil is what reason determines is not consistent with human
nature. The fundamental precept of the
law — lex ratio (“law is reason”) not
lex voluntas (“law is will”) — is
therefore that good is to be done, evil avoided.
Based
on the fact that neo-distributists always cite some authority for their
understanding of what is right and wrong (e.g.,
the pope, Gandhi, Karl Marx, Henry George, Arthur Penty, E. F. Schumacher,
Keynes, Chesterton,
Aquinas, Dorothy Day, the Catholic Worker) as proof of their claims, instead of
as evidence in support of their reasoning, it is fair to conclude that
neo-distributism is based on faith/will, not reason/intellect, that is, on opinion (which may or may not be true),
not knowledge (which is always true). (Cf. Mortimer Adler, “Knowledge and
Opinion,” Ten Philosophical Mistakes.
New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985, 83-107.)
Conclusions
based on sound reasoning are manifestly true even given human imperfection (humanity
is infinitely perfectible, whereas God is infinitely perfect), and even though
we exercise our reason and see the truth “as through a glass in a dark
manner.” (1 Cor. 13:12) If something is clearly contrary to human
reason, it is necessarily contrary to human nature, and is evil, or (at least)
an incorrect or flawed idea of the good.
All things strive for the good, but that doesn't mean that all things
are correct in their understanding of the good.
Reason must be good reason; it cannot be based on faith in anything.
Thus, there is no common ground between the Just Third Way
and neo-distributism as there is with classic distributism. The Just Third Way and classic distributism
share a common basis in reason, which applies to that which is manifestly true. Neo-distributism is based on faith, which
applies to that which is not
manifestly true.
This, of course, does not mean that faith and reason
contradict each other. That would be
impossible. The positive statement of
the first principle of reason (the principle of identity) is, that which is
true is as true, and is true in the same way, as everything else that is
true. Faith and reason complement and
fulfill each other. They do not, nor
could they ever, contradict each other.
Thus, the Just Third Way and classic distributism differ
from neo-distributism not merely on certain specifics, such as the meaning of
justice, charity, and private property, but on fundamental principles. Not surprisingly, Chesterton explained the
problem best. In Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Dumb Ox (1933), Chesterton related
Aquinas’s anger at being confronted with similar illogic:
“[I]n
his last battle and for the first time, [Aquinas] fought as with a
battle-axe. There is a ring in the words
altogether beyond the almost impersonal patience he maintained in debate with
so many enemies. ‘Behold our refutation
of the error. It is not based on
documents of faith, but on the reasons and statements of the philosophers
themselves. If then anyone there be who,
boastfully taking pride in his supposed wisdom, wishes to challenge what we
have written, let him not do it in some corner nor before children who are
powerless to decide on such difficult matters.
Let him reply openly if he dare.
He shall find me there confronting him, and not only my negligible self,
but many another whose study is truth.
We shall do battle with his errors or bring a cure to his ignorance.’”
(Chesterton, The Dumb Ox, op. cit.,
94. Cf. Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas, § 124.)
Why such outrage? As
Chesterton went on,
“If
there is one phrase that stands before history as typical of Thomas Aquinas, it
is that phrase about his own argument: ‘It is not based on documents of faith,
but on the reasons and statements of the philosophers themselves.’ Would that all Orthodox doctors in
deliberation were as reasonable as Aquinas in anger! Would that all Christian apologists would
remember that maxim; and write it up in large letters on the wall, before they
nail any theses there. At the top of his
fury, Thomas Aquinas understands, what so many defenders of orthodoxy will not
understand. It is no good to tell an
atheist that he is an atheist; or to charge a denier of immortality with the
infamy of denying it; or to imagine that one can force an opponent to admit he
is wrong, by proving that he is wrong on somebody else’s principles, but not on
his own. After the great example of St.
Thomas, the principle stands, or ought always to have stood established; that
we must either not argue with a man at all, or we must argue on his grounds and
not ours. We may do other things instead of arguing, according to our
views of what actions are morally permissible; but if we argue we must argue
‘on the reasons and statements of the philosophers themselves.’” (Chesterton, The Dumb Ox, op. cit., 95-96.)
Nowhere does this appear to be more evident than in the
neo-distributist understanding of property and justice, especially distributive
justice.
Thus, the lack of understanding our friend “Buck” finds in
Capital Homesteading may not be due to any problem on his part, or even on the
part of CESJ, but is the result of speaking different “languages” explaining
concepts outside the frame of reference “Buck” employs.
#30#
