As we saw in the previous posting in this series, Msgr. John
A. Ryan seemed to have some significant problems with the teaching authority of
the Catholic Church, in whose name he was presumably speaking. This inserts a degree of ambiguity, possibly
even psychosis or schizophrenia into Ryan’s analysis of Catholic social
teaching, even the natural law on which Catholic social teaching claims to be
based.
This raises the question as to what, exactly, is authentic Catholic social teaching,
especially with respect to “distributive justice” and “social justice.” These were Ryan’s proclaimed areas of
expertise, and in which he seems to have inserted significant changes.
Catholic social teaching regarding all forms of justice is
based on Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy.
Within this philosophical framework at the individual level, justice is
primarily concerned with “commutative” or “strict” justice, and distributive
justice.
Where commutative
justice governs relations between
“independent others,” that is, persons of equal status, distributive justice
governs relations among a group or
community, and members of that group or community, e.g., among the State, and citizens of the State.
Distinguishing
relations between versus among in this context is critical. “Between” assumes an equality of status
between individuals and groups, and thus equal bargaining power. “Among,” on the other hand, assumes
membership in a particular group, and thus unequal status and bargaining power,
e.g., a shareholder in a corporation
who owns one share has one-tenth the bargaining power of a shareholder who owns
ten shares.
Confusing the roles of
commutative justice and distributive justice undermines the whole of civil
society. Such confusion constitutes an
attack on the integrity of the family and the sovereignty of the individual.
With respect to economic activity, distributive justice is the out-take principle connecting all inputs to the
production process to the consumption side of the economic process.
Within the free market, distributive
justice measures the just flow of incomes on the consumption side of the
economic process. It is based on the
exchange or free market value of one’s economic contributions to the productive
process. It holds that all people have a right to receive a proportionate,
market-determined share of the value of the marketable goods and services they
produce through their labor contributions, their capital contributions, or
both.
In contrast to a controlled
or command economy, this understanding of distributive justice respects human
dignity by making each buyer’s economic “vote” count in assessing the value of
goods or services offered by competing sellers of goods and services. Such “votes” determine the just market value
for prices, labor contributions and profits.
Just profits — the so-called
“bottom line” in income statements — determine the just return to those possessing
personal or joint private property rights in productive capital assets. Just profits can only be determined after all
labor costs, material costs and other production costs are covered by the
prices of goods and services that are produced and actually sold in a free,
open, and competitive market system.
Unfortunately, many people
are confused about the role of distributive justice, especially when it comes
to payment for labor (wages). Consistent
with Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, distributive justice determines what is
due (just) in any transaction.
The actual exchange, however, comes under
commutative justice, as do all contracts. Distributive justice tells us what is just in
a particular transaction, while commutative justice requires that what has been
determined to be just in that transaction is delivered, that is, that the terms
of the contract are fulfilled.
Thus, for example, a wage
could be unjust under both distributive justice and commutative justice. Differing from the market rate for the labor
being purchased violates distributive justice.
An employer who cheats the worker out of the agreed-upon wage and fails
to meet the terms of even an unjust contract violates commutative justice.
This is why Pope Pius XI
could declare that, however flawed the system of determining the just returns
to owners of capital and of labor under distributive
justice “in the present condition of human society,” the wage contract (all
contracts, in fact) remains permanently valid under commutative justice (Quadragesimo
Anno, §§ 64-69, 110).
This understanding of
distributive justice based on inputs must be clearly differentiated from
definitions that base distribution on need. The popes and religious leaders like the late
Fulton Sheen, to say nothing of Chesterton, make this clear when critiquing the
Marxist dictum, “From each according to his capacity, to each according to his
needs.” Distribution based on need is a
valid principle for charity, a moral
responsibility, but not for justice,
which (of course) is also a moral responsibility — but justice can be enforced
by the State, while charity cannot. (Rerum Novarum, § 22.)
Charity does have its proper
role, however. As Pope John Paul I
stated in a talk given during a “general audience” during his brief
pontificate, “Charity is the soul of justice.” Nevertheless, as Augustine of Hippo observed,
“Charity is no substitute for justice withheld.” Charity should never be regarded as a substitute for justice, but as the fulfillment of justice. As Moses Maimonides explained,
“The greatest level [of charity], above which
there is no greater, is to support [your fellow man] by endowing him with a
gift or loan, or entering into a partnership with him, or finding employment
for him, in order to strengthen his hand until he need no longer be dependent
upon others.” (Mishneh Torah, Matnot Aniyim X,7)
If confusing the respective roles of commutative and
distributive justice undermines the foundations of civil society, confusing the
roles of charity and justice in general, and distributive and social justice in
particular strikes at humanity’s unique political nature and the place of the
human person in the pólis, the
political unit. This changes what it
means for man to be (in Aristotle’s phrase) “a political animal.” As Pius XI pointed out in the encyclical that
has the “feel” of being a refutation of the philosophy of Msgr. Ryan (at least
in part),
“If Socialism, like all errors, contains some truth (which,
moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have never denied), it is based nevertheless on
a theory of human society peculiar to itself and irreconcilable with true
Christianity. Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are contradictory
terms; no one can be at the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist.” (Quadragesimo
Anno, § 120.)
This is because, while distributive justice governs
relations among a group and members of that group, it remains an individual
justice, directed to the individual good of each member of the group in
proportion to the value of his or her inputs to the group. Social justice, on the other hand, is
directed not at individual goods, but to the common good, the good of the
social order, the institutional environment within which individuals realize
their particular goods.
