A Blog of the Global Justice Movement

Monday, May 21, 2012

The Global Debt Crisis, X: Limits to State Power or Debt

One of the more peculiar ideas to come out of "Modern Monetary Theory" is the belief that public debt is so different from private debt that it should not properly be considered "debt" at all. It should, rather, be considered an asset because it's a debt the nation owes to itself. It's only a question as to which pocket you're carrying the money in, not who owes what to whom. As Moulton explained this rationalization,

"The view that 'a public debt has none of the earmarks of a private debt,' and that 'it should scarcely be called a debt at all' arises from contemplation of the fact that the money collected as taxes flows back to the people as interest receipts." (The New Philosophy of Public Debt, op. cit., 54.)

In other words, the money that the government creates by emitting bills of credit it pays out to citizens in the form of interest payments, adding to their wealth. As Moulton concludes his summary of this position, "The same line of reasoning might be applied to the debt of a state or a city, if such debt were held wholly by the citizens of the particular state or municipality. And, if we consider our states and our cities as a collective whole, all state and local public indebtedness could be looked upon as not really debt at all. Moreover, if we view the corporations of the country collectively, their bonded indebtedness would not really be debt because the income collected from the American people for the services rendered is paid out to the American people as interest. In this way we get rid of all debt problems." (Ibid., 55.)

Really? The size of the debt — or debt itself in any amount — is a problem that solves itself? Keep in mind that Moulton was writing seventy years ago using facts that are readily available to the architects of the current debt disaster. As he continued,

"On second thought, however, it will be reflected that particular railroad companies or industrial corporations, or state or local governments, might find themselves in difficulty because they are unable to make financial ends meet. Likewise, one may reflect that the federal government might, under certain circumstances, find it impossible to collect sufficient revenues to meet its interest and other obligations. National governments have, in fact, frequently found themselves in serious financial difficulties. Thus the mere fact that in all cases the collection of revenues and the payment of interest 'merely shifts money around within the economic system' has not, as historical evidence shows, eliminated the debt problem." (Ibid., 55-56.)

Moulton's analysis continues for several pages showing — in direct, contradictory quotes from the same people — that whether public debt is supposed to be an asset or a liability depends entirely on the audience the politicians are attempting to convince. Those of us who do not have the privilege of being credentialed economists may be baffled by the fact that the experts first say one thing and then another that contradicts what they just said.

That, however, is because (trapped by common sense) we simply don't understand that the basic assumption of Keynesian economics is that the State is all-powerful. Through its power to re-edit the dictionary (as Keynes put it), the State has the ability to change white into black, good into bad, and assets into liabilities and back again, simply by saying so. Natural rights such as liberty (freedom of association/contract) and property are changeable through redefinition at the will of the State. In the end was the Word . . . of the State. So let it be written, so let it be done. As Moulton detailed this magical transformation,

"It was at this stage [in the implementation of the Keynesian New Deal] that the idea of double and multiple budgeting gained popularity — with capital outlays segregated from current expenditures — without too careful a definition of what might properly be included in capital expenditures. It was about this time that emphasis began to be placed upon the 'assets' created by public debts — whether such assets be in the form of tangible properties or intangible services, whether they yield revenues or are simply useful to society. Whatever their character all public outlays are in reality investments. From this point it was an easy step to the proposition that all increases in public expenditures represent income to someone and that all reductions in public expenditures represent loss to someone; and that 'costs and income are just opposite sides of the same shield'." (The New Philosophy of Public Debt, op. cit., 17.)

Thus today we have "investment" in education, new cars, clothes, lunch, or anything else you spend money on, as long as you spend it and expect some benefit from it.

The obvious corollary doesn't seem to occur to people. If the State can change the natural law at will by redefining humanity's natural rights, there is no effective check on State power. Permitting the State to control the economy (and thus people's lives) by controlling money and credit — the means of acquiring and possessing property — allows the State to acquire absolute power. Thus, by the simple expedient of controlling the definition of both the substantial nature and the exercise of rights presumably inherent in the human person, the State becomes supreme in everything. The State becomes to all intents and purposes a god.

This explains the basis for what Moulton called "the new philosophy of public debt," although (as we might expect), it was not something he investigated or discussed. Understanding this, however, we can understand how Keynesians can believe, all evidence to the contrary, that there need be no limits to the public debt. The power of a god is presumably without limit. That being the case, the exercise of that power is also without limit. Since public debt is simply an exercise of divine State power, there is no reason why there should be any limit to the size of the debt, or why it should even be regarded as a problem.

Nevertheless, Keynesian economists are nothing if not flexible. Having asserted that there is no known limit to public debt, they hedge their bets by saying that there might, after all, be limits. As Moulton related,

"Notwithstanding the contention that the public debt is not a real debt and that we can be at ease because there is merely involved a shifting about of money income, Mr. Hansen [Alvin H. Hansen, the "American Keynes"] has come to have some reservations with respect to the ultimate size of the public debt. In a recent article — although he still argues most of the time that the growth of the public debt is of no real significance — he finally reaches the surprising conclusion that 'the debt should cause no anxiety so long as it is kept within safe limits'." (The New Philosophy of Public Debt, op. cit., 65-66.)

The limit? Approximately twice GDP should be perfectly safe — at least according to Hansen. (Ibid.) The riots and demonstrations throughout the world today, however, tend to suggest that the idea that a limit to public debt of twice GDP might be a trifle optimistic.

Obviously something is seriously wrong with "the new philosophy of public debt" if it can bring the world to the brink of economic catastrophe. Nor is the habit of the experts and the politicians — all of whom have a vested interest in maintaining the current system, if only to save face — of denying that there is even a problem of any real help in coming up with a solution. What is needed is something new, something that breaks out of the current Keynesian box and gives us an entirely new approach on which to develop a solution.

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4 comments:

Calgacus said...

One of the more peculiar ideas to come out of "Modern Monetary Theory" is the belief that public debt is so different from private debt that it should not properly be considered "debt" at all. That is not what MMT says, but a confusion that many MMT fans have. (Granted, some of the MMT academics can be quite confusing about it.)

The person to read is Alfred Mitchell-Innes - Randall Wray, imho the clearest modern MMTer - has called his two forgotten papers of a century ago the best ever written on money. The whole point of MMT is that money is always credit=debt, and is never a commodity, a thing. Whether it is credit/asset or debt/liability depends on which way you look at - it's just 2 ways of looking at the same thing. Money, public or private debt is always both an asset & a liability. Everything else in Keynes & MMT flows from this, and it accurately describes how economics has always worked.

I had something of a mild interest in Moulton - because I was interested in his longtime collaborator, Leo Pasvolsky. I wrote the Wikipedia article on Pasvolsky & idly thought of writing one on Moulton too.

I'm a pretty rabid MMTer, and consider Moulton to be quite wrong, but his mistakes are interesting, and close to mistaken ideas among MMT fans I've been trying to criticize for some time. At least he's not "not even wrong", which is what most modern mainstream academic economics is. So I've found your blog, which I've just discovered, to be quite interesting & valuable.

Michael D. Greaney said...

According to Henry Dunning Macleod, money and credit are simply two forms of the same thing. Yes, an asset belonging to one person is a liability belonging to another. The mistake the Keynesians make is to claim that something is both an asset and a liability to the same person.

The conflict between the Keynesians and Moulton is easy to understand once we realize that each side is using a different definition of money. The problem is that Moulton understood the Keynesian position, but the Keynesians cannot understand his.

This is because Moulton was "banking school," while Keynesian economics (despite claims to the contrary) is "currency school." The banking school's fundamental principle is Say's Law of Markets as applied in the real bills doctrine, and defines money as anything that is accepted in settlement of a debt. The currency school's fundamental principle is that money represents a general claim on the wealth of society, and consists of coin, banknotes, demand deposits, and some time deposits. The currency school redefines or rejects Say's Law, and always rejects the real bills doctrine.

As G. K. Chesterton pointed out, it is simplicity itself to prove the other party wrong on your principles. The hard work is proving somebody wrong on his own principles. Keynes and the Keynesians (and, earlier, Georg Friedrich Knapp) simply rejected anything relating to the basic principles of the banking school, contenting themselves with saying it was all wrong because it contradicts what they accept as articles of faith. In "The New Philosophy of Public Debt" (1943) Moulton demolished Keynesian claims about money using the Keynesians' own statements and analysis. This, in my opinion, may be why the Brookings Institution ignores all requests to reprint "The New Philosophy of Public Debt." It completely destroys their position, and counters Keynesian ridicule with logic and hard evidence.

Calgacus said...

The mistake the Keynesians make is to claim that something is both an asset and a liability to the same person. Have not seen this mistake made, as far as I can tell, and would be grateful if you could explain. If one looks at a nation, or the world, as a whole, well of course, there is no credit or debt, because you've just decided to ignore it, they've all canceled out.

It is very interesting that these MMT fans, slightly abetted by the MMT academics, are making the same "not really debt" mistake that people like Hansen propagated - turning into the neoclassical synthesis Keynesians that destroyed Keynes's theory. While the real Keynesians, like Lerner, ancestor of the MMTers, never made this fundamental mistake.

The MMT definition of money is that it is debt (an abstract relationship) which is transferable in some community. Not something that will settle a debt, not a debt for a thing, not primarily a "medium of exchange", just abstract debt. The larger the sphere, the higher on the "pyramid of money". The best book on this imho is not by a core MMTer, but by Geoffrey Ingham - The Nature of Money. He has a good essay from a collection by Smithin that's available online.

IMHO things like Say's Law, Real Bills can't be considered as fundamental principles and shouldn't be introduced at this stage - they're far too complicated. Your points about Banking vs. Currency School are interesting, they both had something to say. But what is important is not who said what, but what is true.

I knew little about Moulton & find your recent series fascinating, even though I disagree, and eager to learn more. May get his book. Is it online somewhere? And Kelso & "binary economics" is at least as interesting. Seems to me to be quite close to MMT in many respects, which might not be too visible at first.

To me, "The New Philosophy" is very obviously, tautologically right, once understood correctly. Worrying about debt/gdp ratios and the like, to the expense of the real economy & real people is absurd. Why should anyone care about 200% debt/gdp? A sovereign government's (e.g. not Eurozone) debt is represented by the government writing some numbers on a piece of paper. How can there be any conceivable constraint on this other than inflation?

Michael D. Greaney said...

There is a fundamental difference between the understanding of money and credit in Keynesian, Monetarist/Chicago and Austrian economics, and that in binary economics and the classical economics of Smith, Thornton, Say, Fullerton and Moulton.

The latter base the definition of money on the legal and accounting definition: anything that is accepted in settlement of a debt, that is, bills of exchange backed by the present value of existing and future marketable goods and services.

The former limit it to officially sanctioned coin, currency, and State-emitted bills of credit ("constitutional" bills of exchange) backed by the faith and credit of the government.

Moulton's analysis of the Keynesian/chartalist approach to debt financing is best presented in "The New Philosophy of Public Debt," which is unfortunately rare. It was published by Brookings in 1943, and is not available on the internet. It might be in some libraries or through a book search. Moulton carefully presents his case, showing where the Keynesians contradict themselves in their understanding of money and credit, and, especially, the management of debt.