In the
previous posting on this subject, we noted that Monsignor John A. Ryan
(1869-1945) had his thought formed in an environment that accepted “the
democratic religion” of socialism as a given.
The idea was to reduce Christianity to its essential elements, of which
the first and overriding principle is that material wellbeing of everyone,
especially the poor, is the goal of existence.
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| Henri de Saint-Simon |
As it was
expressed in the thought of Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), one of the prophets of the New
Christianity, “The whole of society ought to strive towards the amelioration of
the moral and physical existence of the poorest class; society ought to
organize itself in the way best adapted for attaining this end.” (“Saint-Simon,”
Encyclopedia Britannica, 19: 14th
Edition, 1956, Print.) In the New
Christian framework, “distributive justice” and “social justice” mean
distribution on the basis of need.
What surprises
many people who have bought into Ryan’s definitions of distributive justice and
social justice (not actually his, as he lifted them almost verbatim from
socialism and modernism) is that Catholic social teaching developed as a
discrete area within the Magisterium specifically to refute socialism,
modernism, and the New Age. In
particular, Catholic social teaching focused on the idea that distribution
should be made on the basis of need as a matter of course instead of as an
expedient in an emergency.
To explain, in Aristotelian-Thomist
philosophy, distributive justice means the species of justice “wherein equality depends not
on quantity but on proportion.” For
example, someone who contributes 10% to a common endeavor receives 10% of the
gain or suffers 10% of the loss. (Catechism
of the Catholic Church, § 2411.)
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| Msgr. Aloysius Taparelli, S.J. |
Ryan’s alleged
development of doctrine in his doctoral thesis (A Living Wage, 1906) and his magnum opus (Distributive Justice, 1916) amounted to nothing more than rejecting
the classical understanding of distributive justice and Msgr. Taparelli’s principle of social
justice. Ryan then replaced both with
the meanings used by the utopian and religious socialists in the 1830s and
1840s. Contradicting traditional Catholic teaching (Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the
Church, § 201), Ryan’s
version of social justice/distributive justice was therefore indistinguishable
from the socialist and modernist understanding of the terms.
This, of course, is hardly
surprising. As G.K. Chesterton said, “[A]pparently
anything can be called Socialism, . . . If it means anything, it seems to mean
Modernism; in the sociological as distinct from the theological sense. In both senses, it is generally a euphemism
for muddle-headedness.” (G.K. Chesterton, “There Was a Socialist,” G.K.’s Weekly, May 10, 1930; cf. Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio, § 61.)
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| G.K. Chesterton |
Thus, in common
with the utopian and religious socialists of the 1830s and 1840s, Ryan defined
both distributive justice and social justice as distributing on the basis of
need rather than equality or proportionality of inputs, and did not even mention
restructuring the social order in connection with social justice. His adopted formulation not only
abolished commutative justice, it added distribution on the basis of
need to the classical understanding of distributive justice.
When combined with a general intention for the common good (classical
legal justice),
and controlled by the State,
Ryan claimed that distributive justice became “social justice.”
To fund increased demands on
State resources, Ryan expanded Henry George’s single tax concept from land, to all property income.
The first part of Distributive
Justice, however, has a detailed analysis of George’s theory of title, ostensibly
refuting George’s rejection of a legitimate
basis for private ownership of land.
This has led many people to claim that Ryan repudiated his earlier enthusiasm for George’s thought. (Robert V.
Andelson, “Monsignor John A. Ryan’s Critique of Henry George.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology,
1974 33 (3): 273-286.)
The issue of
title was a diversion. Legal title was
not an issue for George. Title, as far as he was concerned, is
irrelevant.
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| Henry George |
For George, real ownership resides in whoever has the right of disposal
and enjoyment of the fruits: the income generated by what is owned. As he explained, “rent being taken by the
State in taxes, land, no matter in whose
name it stood . . . would be really common property.” (Henry George, Progress and Poverty. New York: The Robert Schalkenbach Foundation,
1935, 406.).
There was in
reality only one divergence between George and Ryan, and it is a difference
that made no difference. Where George
argued that private property in land is not a natural right and therefore
alienable (ibid., 333-346), Ryan
declared that private property in land is a natural right, but that private
property as a natural right is alienable. (Ryan, A
Living Wage. New York: Grosset and Dunlap,
70-72.)
Ryan applied George’s principle to all forms of
capital,
not just land, justifying taking all profits by taxation. Originating in German socialism (Joseph A. Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 186), taxation for social purposes
and control over the economy, not abolition of nominal title, was the real goal
for both George and Ryan. In The
Framework of the Christian State (1932), Rev. Edward J. Cahill, S.J.
(1868-1941) linked George and Ryan when analyzing George’s theories. (Rev. E. Cahill,
The Framework of a Christian State. Dublin, Éire: M.H. Gill and Son, Ltd., 1932,
532-533.)
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| Fr. Heinrich Pesch, S.J. |
Franz Herman Mueller (1900-1994), a student of Heinrich Pesch,
S.J., noted that Ryan’s advocacy of confiscatory taxation to fund public works and social welfare “comes
close to Henry George’s ideas.” (Franz H. Mueller, The Church and the Social Question. Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1984, 105.) “‘Unearned increments’ in
the value of land” should be taxed away (ibid.),
and “[u]nearned incomes through stock and commodity exchange manipulations
should also be prevented by law.” (Ibid.,
105-106.)
Still, despite
reorienting moral philosophy along modernist lines and his “daily excursions
close to excommunication,” Ryan avoided censure due to his skill at
equivocation and political maneuvering. (Goldman, Eric F., Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1956, 86.)
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| Coxey's Army: "The Commonweal of Christ" |
Although fears of
excommunication were for effect, the need to prevaricate was real. This is because Ryan reinterpreted Rerum Novarum to justify a vast expansion of State power explicitly repudiated in the document
itself. (Rerum Novarum, § 7.) As
historian Eric Frederick Goldman (1916-1989) related,
Ryan proceeded to apply the Rerum Novarum in a way scarcely
distinguishable from the Reform Darwinists [Cf. Pascendi Dominici Gregis, § 13] of Protestants and Jews. . . .
After Ryan had been hurling the Rerum Novarum at his enemies for years,
a reform-minded rabbi achieved a masterpiece of superfluity by saying to the
priest: “You have a very great advantage over men in my position. . . . You can
hang your ‘radical’ utterances on a papal encyclical.”
“Yes,” I suppose there is something to that,” said Father Ryan, smiling. (Goldman, Rendezvous
with Destiny, op. cit., 86.)
Ryan’s social program was similar
to that of the populist Jacob Sechler Coxey, Jr. (1854-1951), who had “leanings”
toward theosophy, the principal influence on late nineteenth century New Age thought.
In 1894, when Ryan was in his
mid-twenties, Coxey’s widely publicized army had marched across the country to
demand inflation-financed government assistance during the Great Depression of
1893-1898. (Carlos A. Schwantes, Coxey’s
Army: An American Odyssey. Lincoln,
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985.)
How well Ryan’s
thought compares with Catholic philosophy and social teaching will be addressed
in the next posting on this subject.
#30#