As we saw in the previous posting on this subject, politicians could not keep their hands of the
central bank’s money machine. Other
factors also contributed to laying the groundwork for financial disaster.
"Something is wrong with the economy . . . but what?" |
The business boom
fueled a rise in share values, which in turn tempted many people to speculate
in the stock market. Convinced that
prices would continue to rise, investment banks connected with commercial banks
created money at a tremendous rate for the purchase of speculative shares on
credit, sometimes with as little at 3% down.
At the same time, commercial banks created money as usual for
agriculture, industry, and commerce.
When the crash
came in October 1929, the banking system found itself over-extended in
speculative securities loans that went into default. With the sudden constriction in the money
supply and fall in consumer demand, farmers and businessmen were unable in many
cases to make debt service payments.
Banks were forced to call loans.
Farmers lost their land, and businesses either went bankrupt or
retrenched.
Harold G. Moulton |
Moulton agreed
that better regulation of the financial system was essential, especially
separating commercial and investment banking. (Harold G. Moulton, Capital Expansion, Employment, and Economic
Stability. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1940, 228-254.)
He disagreed strongly, however, with the prescription of John Maynard
Keynes (1883-1946) that funded the New Deal with enormous issues of monetized
government debt. (Harold G. Moulton, The
New Philosophy of Public Debt.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1943.) He also viewed with
alarm the effective government takeover of the Federal Reserve that put control
over money and credit back in the hands of the politicians and Wall Street.
(Harold G. Moulton, Financial
Organization and the Economic System.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938, 416-417.)
Paradoxically,
one key to recovery in a modern economy Moulton rejected was expanded capital
ownership. He proved in The Formation of Capital (1935) that
self-liquidating new capital can be
financed by the expansion of commercial bank credit without redistribution. (Harold
G. Moulton, The Formation of Capital. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1935, 75-84.) He then contradicted his own findings in the follow up volume, Income and Economic Progress (1935) by
asserting that broad-based capital ownership is impossible without
redistribution, all the while limiting his analysis to existing wealth. (Harold G. Moulton, Income and Economic Progress.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1935, 72-83.)
John Maynard Keynes |
Ownership and
wealth have become increasingly concentrated, government and consumer debt have
skyrocketed, and currency instability is the rule rather than the exception
throughout the world. As ordinary people
have lost economic and thus political power, moral relativism has spread,
virtue has been redefined or ridiculed, and family, religious, and civil life
have degenerated at an astonishing rate.
Nevertheless,
despite widespread fear and even despair, there is hope, as the young Louis
Kelso firmly believed when he set himself to study the situation in the 1930s.
#30#