In the previous posting on this subject, we contended that
the Oxford Movement was an exemplar of social justice a century before the term
had the precise meaning Pope Pius XI assigned it in his social doctrine. Prior to the late 1840s, in fact, “social
justice” had a variety of meanings almost completely unrelated to any concept
of social virtue. That would come only
with the work of Monsignor Luigi Aloysius Taparelli d’Azeglio,
S.J. (1793-1862), and would rapidly be hijacked by the socialists.
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| Monsignor Aloysius Taparelli |
The hijacking of social justice, however, was at least a
decade in the future in 1833 when John Keble gave his sermon on “National
Apostasy.” It must also be understood
that by “exemplar of social justice,” we mean a material adherence to the techniques
of social justice, and a generally close adherence to the norms of the natural
law, albeit with a little stumbling when it came to distinguishing between the
principle involved and the application of the principle involved.
For example, except as a temporary expedient (e.g., the virtual disappearance of civil
authority in some areas during the early Middle Ages), union of Church and
State is a very bad idea. It inevitably
happens that the religion attempts to impose religious doctrines on civil life,
politics starts to influence religious doctrine, or both.
One of the first reforms Pope Pius IX (Giovanni
Maria Mastai-Ferretti, 1792-1878, elected 1846) attempted to implement,
in fact, was a complete separation of the civil administration of the Papal
States from the purely religious teachings of the Catholic Church. His idea was to transform the papacy into a
liberal constitutional monarchy with limited powers of the executive on the
American model in the civil realm, while retaining full religious authority as
head of the Catholic Church. He failed
due to a number of factors not directly related to the subject of this study
and has been egregiously misunderstood ever since by both liberals and
conservatives.
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| Rev. John Keble |
This, of course, does not deny the legitimacy of a
religious state, but it also does not deny that it is ordinarily a very bad
idea to have one, and hardly recommended, especially as a permanent
arrangement. Members of the Oxford
Movement, however, insisted on a union of Church and State as the only
acceptable arrangement . . . but then contradicted themselves by insisting with
equal vehemence that England should be guided politically by the Church of
England and almost in the same breath condemned the pope for exercising civil
authority in the Papal States.
In any event, John Henry Newman had been sojourning in
Italy, and while there had suffered a near-fatal illness he contracted in
Sicily. He recovered and returned to
England, arriving on July 9, 1833. Less
than a week later on July 14 Keble preached the sermon that is credited with
beginning the Oxford Movement. Newman
was inspired. As Maisie Ward described
his attitude,
[Newman] says of himself that he undertook the work of the
Movement in a spirit that was “fierce yet sportive”. James Mozley describes him as “perfectly
ferocious in the cause, and proportionately sanguine of success — ‘We’ll do
them,’ he says at least twenty times a day — meaning, by ‘them’, the present
race of aristocrats, and the Liberal oppressors of the Church in general.” (Ward,
Young Mr. Newman, op. cit., 258.)
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| Hugh James Rose |
It is significant that even at this early date Newman
linked those whom he identified (erroneously) as the English type liberal élite with the French type liberal
“oppressors” of the Church of England.
Later he would lump all liberalism together, failing to realize the
profound difference between the English and French forms (which fosters
capitalism and socialism, respectively), and the American form chronicled by
Alexis de Tocqueville (which fosters economic and political personalism).
That, however, takes nothing away from the point: the
effectiveness of the act of social justice when carried out in a manner
consistent with the laws and characteristics of social justice, the hallmark of
which is organizing for the common good of the institution within which those
concerned “subsist” or “subside.” Solidarity
and subsidiarity are essential. As the
Oxford Movement and its aftermath demonstrated, acts of social justice can only
be undertaken by those inside the institution itself. Outsiders may give helpful, even necessary
assistance, but they cannot by definition undertake acts of social justice. That can only be done by members of the group
or institution being affected.
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| Richard Hurrell Froude |
Shortly after Keble’s sermon, a small group of concerned
individuals met at the rectory of Hadleigh, where Hugh James Rose (1795-1838)
was pastor. Present at the conference,
which soon afterwards resulted in the formation of “Association of Friends of the
Church,” were Rose, Richard Hurrell Froude (1803-1836), William Palmer
(1803-1885), and Arthur Philip Perceval (1799-1853).
Newman was not present, but evidently received a full
report from Froude. Judging from the
letter Newman wrote to Keble, Froude and Perceval wanted to charge forward,
full speed ahead — although in different ways, which caused a little lively
debate between Froude and Perceval, at least according to Keble — Rose wanted
to plan carefully before taking any action (a position with which Newman
agreed), while Palmer was “desperately cautious” to the point of inaction.
(Ward, Young Mr. Newman, op. cit.
239.)
The first decision that confronted the group once they had
decided on action was whether to form an association with chapters throughout
the United Kingdom, or issue “tracts.” A
tract is a brief pamphlet or flyer traditionally used for religious purposes as
a means of exhorting people to reform their lives in some manner. They are often distributed free of charge,
left in convenient places for any who wish to take them, or sold at as low a
cost as possible.
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| John Henry Newman |
The group compromised by deciding first to form a network
of societies and then issue tracts through them. Anonymity of authorship would be preserved to
enhance the appearance of solidarity and hopefully prevent the idea that the
tracts conveyed personal opinion instead of established orthodox doctrine.
What the members of the Movement proposed with their
tracts was something significantly different from the usual religious tract,
even revolutionary in a way. Of course,
the tract format would alert the public that the subject was religious in
nature, but the idea was not merely to exhort, but to instruct. This would serve the double purpose of
spreading word of the Movement and teach people the fundamentals of Church of
England beliefs as those in the Movement understood them.
What the group considered the “compromise” of first
forming a network of societies before issuing tracts was, in social justice
terms, a stroke of genius. It is, in
fact, virtually impossible to address systemic social problems without doing so
in a social manner, and that means organizing for the common good.
Unfortunately, that was as far as it went. Although Newman noted soon after the decision
to form societies that there seemed to be a number of them “in germ” in half a
dozen counties in England, they failed to develop further. The fact was that without common agreement on
fundamental principles, it was impossible to form viable societies apart from
the original one at Oxford that had its inception during the meeting at
Hadleigh.
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| The Oxford Movement members. |
Even among the original members of the Oxford Movement it was
difficult to get anything other than a general, even at times vague agreement on
basic principles. Although he later discovered
otherwise to his cost, Newman believed that this was one of the greatest
strengths of the Movement. In his
opinion, the Church of England couldn’t get too specific on principle as it
“was intended to cope with human nature in all its forms” (ibid., 240). In this Newman unconsciously
acknowledged that the Church of England was more of a political institution
than a religious one, at least in that respect.
As a political institution, insisting on too great a
specificity on doctrine in the Church of England without allowing room for
personal interpretation would drive people away, especially the ones the
members of the Movement most wanted to reach.
As Newman said in a letter to Keble, “I doubt whether the Society ought
to pledge itself to more than a general approval of the principles of any
tracts” as they would be dull and “take no one.” (Ibid.,
241.)
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| The Movement as seen in the secular press. |
It is important to understand that ordinarily in social
justice what Newman said would have been adequate. He was correct from a technical point of
view. In social justice, institutions
must continually adapt applications of principles, and the principles must be
stated in as broad and general manner as possible so as not to exclude anyone
unnecessarily. This is especially true
with a religion, that must be able to adapt its applications of fundamental
principles constantly, but without changing fundamental doctrine.
. . . except when what is adapted is not the applications
of principles, but the principles themselves.
Problems in the Church of England at this point were calling basic
doctrines, even in some cases the fact of doctrine itself, into question. When reform of an institution involves
clarifying or identifying fundamental principles, then the utmost precision is
not merely desirable, but absolutely essential.
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| Aristotle: Small errors lead to great errors. |
Newman was wrong, therefore, with respect to the
fundamental precepts of a religion or a philosophy because there it is possible
to be just a little — or a lot — too
broad and general, making that small mistake in the beginning that leads to
great errors in the end much more likely.
The fundamental precept of the natural law (good is to be done, evil
avoided), and that of the supernatural law (love one another) are sufficient
for those who have the time to reason things out and — very important — have no
flaw in their reasoning. It is, however,
far from adequate for most people, who simply lack the time and other resources
to think things through without making material errors. It is a disaster when (as was the case in
England at this time) there are people working to undermine the meaning of
doctrine, or even the idea of doctrine itself.
Again, it must be stressed that what Newman and his
associates carried out were acts of social justice that conformed to the
principles of social justice in broad outline.
This accounts for the early success of the Movement.
The refusal to agree on fundamental principles in a more
precise manner, however, ensured that the flaws that always crop up in any
human endeavor would be more serious and exaggerated in their effects, even ruinous,
than they otherwise would have been. It
is, after all, one thing for people to disagree — sometimes violently — on how
to get from point A to point B. As we
will see in the next posting on this subject, it is quite another thing
altogether for people to disagree on whether their goal is point B, C, D, or
any other.
#30#