In the previous posting in this series we (very briefly)
traced the recent development of reason-based social thought since Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, a development that took
place within the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical framework. It is clear that G. K. Chesterton, along with
Fulton Sheen, the popes, and others, based his social thought solidly on the
natural law based on God’s Nature self-realized in His Intellect, that is,
reason (lex ratio), not the Will,
that is, faith (lex voluntas).
Considering that it seems to be for his social thought as
well as his personal (presumed) sanctity and heroic virtue that Chesterton’s
“process for canonization” is being considered, his reliance on
Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy is all to the good. What is not all to the good — or good in any
way — is the fact that the followers of the “Apostle of Common Sense” have, in
large measure, abandoned that same reason-based Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy,
confused form with substance, and gone with their own versions of a faith-based
system that has only superficial resemblance to anything Chesterton was talking
about.
That is, the Chestertonian Establishment has, in large
measure, replaced the Aquinas’s thought with something that, while it “looks”
the same and uses many of the same terms and concepts, bases matters on faith
instead of reason, and thus on charity instead of justice. The Chestertonian Establishment ends up 180
degrees from Chesterton’s actual position.
Thus, a Professional Chestertonian or neo-distributist of today would
assert that, “It’s true because I believe that’s what Chesterton/the Church/Carleton
the Doorman said.”
A member of the Chestertonian Establishment does not
typically state a premise, prove the premise true by presenting a logical
argument or empirical evidence, and then conclude that Chesterton/the
Church/Carleton the Doorman said something because it’s true. Instead, you hear that “because so-and-so said” (or words to that effect) stated as conclusive
proof, rather than “as so-and-so
said” offered in support of proof already presented.
Not that the work of Chesterton, Sheen, Pesch, Mounier, Kelso
and Adler, or even the popes is perfect in every way, of course. All of it is, nevertheless, definitely headed
in the right direction. Just as, e.g., the popes developed Pesch’s and
Mounier’s work by integrating the act of social justice, the addition of Kelso
and Adler’s three principles of economic justice and the reorientation of
financial assumptions away from the currency principle and toward the banking
principle clarifies and develops the thought of the popes. (Returning the compliment, that of the popes
fleshes out the work of Kelso and Adler.)
This raises the question as to what, exactly, are the “three
principles of economic justice.” To
explain, the three principles of economic justice as CESJ has integrated them
into the overall framework of the Just Third Way are:
1. Participative
Justice. This is how one makes “input” to the
economic process in order to make a living. It requires equal opportunity in
gaining access to private property in productive assets as well as equality of
opportunity to engage in productive work. Participative justice does not
guarantee equal results, but requires that every person be guaranteed by
society’s institutions the equal human right to make a productive contribution
to the economy, both through one’s labor (as a worker) and through one’s
productive capital (as an owner). Thus, this principle rejects monopolies,
special privileges, and other exclusionary social barriers to economic
self-reliance and personal freedom.
2. Distributive
Justice. This is the out-take principle
described in legal terms as the form of justice “which should govern the distribution of
rewards and punishments. It assigns to each person the rewards which his or her personal merit or
services deserve, or the proper punishment for his crimes.” (“Justice,” Black’s Law Dictionary. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing
Company, 1951.)
Distributive justice is based on the exchange or market value of one’s economic
contributions — that all people have a right to receive a proportionate,
market-deter-mined share of the value of the marketable goods and services they
produce with their labor contributions, their capital contributions, or both. In contrast to a
controlled or command economy, this respects human dignity by making each
economic “vote” count.
This understanding of distributive justice based on inputs must be clearly differentiated
from definitions that base distribution on need. Sheen makes this clear when critiquing the Marxist
dictum, “From each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs.” (Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875.) Distribution on need is a valid principle for
charity, a moral
responsibility,
but not for justice, which (of
course) is also a moral responsibility.
Charity does have its proper role, however. As Pope
John Paul I stated in a talk given during a “general
audience” during his brief pontificate, “Charity is the soul of justice.” (John Paul I, General
Audience, Wednesday, September 6, 1978.) Nevertheless, as Augustine of Hippo observed, “Charity is no substitute
for justice withheld.” Charity should never be regarded as
a substitute for justice, but as the fulfillment of justice. As Moses Maimonides explained,
“The
greatest level [of charity], above which there is no
greater, is to support [your fellow man] by endowing him with a gift or loan,
or entering into a partnership with him, or finding employment for him, in
order to strengthen his hand until he need no longer be dependent upon others.”
(Mishneh Torah, Laws of Charity, 10:7-14.)
3. Social Justice. This is the feedback
principle that results in harmony, that rebalances
participative justice and distributive justice when the system violates either essential
principle. Social justice includes a concept of limitation that discourages personal greed and prevents
social monopolies. In general, social justice holds that every person has a personal responsibility to organize with others to correct their
organizations, institutions, laws and the social order itself at every level whenever the principles
of participative justice or distributive justice are violated or not operating properly.
What
we’re concerned with here is the application of social justice to the common
good of specific economic institutions in order to bring those institutions
into conformity with the demands of the common good of all society.
Most briefly stated, the “currency principle” to which we
referred is that “money” consists or can consist exclusively of the present
value of past reductions in consumption (“past savings”). Thus — unless we change the meaning of the
natural rights of private property and free association/contract — under
ordinary circumstances the only people who can own capital are those who are
already rich enough to be able to reduce consumption and accumulate “past savings.” If we abolish private property and freedom of
association/contract, of course, we can turn matters over to the community or
State, thereby replacing a natural law based on reason (lex ratio), with one based on will or faith (lex voluntas).
Just as briefly stated, the “banking principle” to which we
referred is that “money” consists of anything that can be accepted in
settlement of a debt (“all things transferred in commerce”). That is, “money” consists of anything that
has a “present value” that can be transferred in commerce to settle a debt. Specifically, “money” consists of a claim on both
past and future savings, the present
value of both past reductions in consumption and future increases in production.
All “money” is therefore a contract, just as (in a sense) all contracts
are money.
Money therefore consists of offer, acceptance, and consideration, the basic elements of all
contracts. “Consideration” is defined as
“the inducement to enter into a contract,” that is, whatever of value is being
exchanged (or why bother to enter into a contract?), that the parties to the
contract must own as private property.
To say, then, that money is a general claim on the wealth of society
abolishes private property. To say that
only the State can create money abolishes freedom of association/contract.
There is also the rather legalistic point that all contracts
come under commutative justice, while the State operates on the basis of
distributive justice. Distributive
justice functions to determine what is just in a particular situation, while
commutative justice functions to see that it is delivered. For example, the determination of a just wage
under specific conditions falls under distributive justice, while its payment
falls under commutative justice.
Given that existing accumulations of wealth are not,
strictly speaking, necessary for someone to be able to agree to deliver wealth
in the future (collateral is a separate issue that we won’t get into here),
anybody whose promise is good can use that promise to finance new capital
formation and become a capital owner, paying for the capital with future
increases in production instead of past reductions in consumption. Ownership of new capital need no longer be a
virtual monopoly of the currently wealthy (capitalism), or an actual monopoly
of the community or State (socialism).
Unfortunately, members of the Chestertonian Establishment —
as well as a large number of other people, notably academics and politicians —
have, in the course of their abandonment or rejection of Aristotelian-Thomist
philosophy (or because of it), redefined these critical terms. “Distributive justice” that governs
the determination of distributions based on a pro rata
contribution to production, has been changed to mean actual distribution based on need
or “gift.” Commutative justice, the
justice governing all contracts and thus the delivery or fulfillment of what is
just, seems to have been abolished altogether.
“Social justice,” instead of being the particular virtue
directed to the common good (specifically those institutions that make up the
common good), is now just another name for the redefined “distributive
justice,” which is actually coerced redistribution, a form of false charity,
and neither justice nor charity.
Concepts of money and credit are so confused that the terms mean
anything and everything.
The question now, of course, is, how did this mix-up happen? How did something so reasonable as the
application of basic principles of the natural law, even the principles
themselves, get twisted so far out of shape that it bears no resemblance “to
what, if left to themselves, common men would call common sense”? (Chesterton, The “Dumb Ox,” op. cit., 145.)
