“No
thesis in the philosophy of St. Thomas is clearer than that which asserts that
all knowledge rests upon a single first principle. To it all other principles of thought may be reduced. Upon it all depend for their validity. Without it there can be no certitude, but
only opinion.(1) Whether we choose to
express this absolute, first principle in the form of an affirmation — the
principle of identity — or in the form of a negation — the principle of
contradiction — it matters not. The
point is, that unless our knowledge hangs upon this basic principle, it is
devoid of certainty. Wherefore,
causality — efficient, formal, material or final — must attach itself in some
manner to the principle of identity. In
the Thomistic view, the connection is immediate. Its very immediateness gives to the notion of
causality the absolute necessity and complete universality of the ultimate
principle.
“He who
denies causality must ultimately deny the principle of identity and the
principle of contradiction — and this is mental suicide.(2) It is to assert that that which has not in
itself and by itself its reason of being, is its own reason of being; or, in
other words, is and is not, under the same formal consideration.” (Fulton J.
Sheen, God and Intelligence in Modern
Philosophy: A Critical Study in the Light of the Philosophy of Saint Thomas. New York: IVE Press, 2009, 197.)
(1) I-II
q. 94 art. 2; C. G., lib. 2 c. 83; Post. Analy., lib. 2 lect. 20; 1 d. 35
q. 1 art. 3 ad 2. (Note in text. “C. G.”
refers to the Summa Contra Gentiles;
“Post. Analy.” refers to Expositio Libri
Posteriorum Analyticorum.)
(2)
“Quia etsi non possunt demonstrari simpliciter, tum Philosophus primus tentat monstrare
eo modo quo est possibile, scilicet, contradicendo negantibus ea, per ea quae
oportet ab eis concede, non per ea quae sunt magis nota.” — Post. Analy., lib. 1 lect. 20. (Note in
text.)
This quote from Fulton Sheen’s first book (to which G. K. Chesterton
wrote the Introduction) makes it clear that (at least in Sheen’s analysis),
whether you’re talking about faith or reason, nothing is more important with respect to the natural law than
that reason — that which Aquinas called the Intellect as opposed to the Will —
be given primacy. As Sheen made clear,
since reality itself is based on God’s Nature, self-realized in His Intellect
(and therefore discernible by “human reason by its own natural force and light” — Pius XII, Humani Generis, § 2), even the strongest
faith cannot violate the principles of reason.
Since God is, above all, reasonable,
neither God, nor our faith in God, can contradict Him or our faith in Him.
Misplaced
faith, however fervent, cannot legitimately override reason, any more than reason can
disprove faith. Each one fulfills and
completes the other. Humanity as a
reflection of God’s Nature being intellectual,
“. . . [i]ntellectual
restoration is the condition of economic and political restoration. Intellectual values are needed more than
‘cosmic imaginings,’ and God is needed more than ‘a new idea of God.’ If we look to the foundations, the
superstructure will take care of itself.
Thomistic Intellectualism is the remedy against anarchy of ideas, riot
of philosophical systems and breakdown of spiritual forces.” (Sheen, God and Intelligence, op. cit., 24.)
Sheen’s analysis, incidentally, possibly explains why some
who consider themselves faithful adherents of “religion” or “science” that they
base wholly on a distorted and distorting concept of faith that triumphs over sound
reason, usually reject the Just Third Way, CESJ’s natural law-based
intellectual framework for “economic and political restoration.” The Just Third Way faces a double difficulty
with such people.
With respect to social justice, the Just Third Way is based
solidly on Pius XI’s neo-Thomist breakthrough in moral philosophy, summarized
by Father William J. Ferree as “the act of social justice.” (Rev. William J. Ferree, S.M., Ph.D., The Act of Social Justice. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1942.) Louis O. Kelso and
Mortimer J. Adler’s three principles of economic justice are also set firmly
within the Aristotelian-Thomist analytical framework.
Not accepting the basic principles of human reason — most
especially the first principle of reason, that is, the principle of
contradiction/identity — such people cannot reconcile their personal belief
system (whether they regard it as “religion” or “science”) with the
contradictions they require to maintain their respective positions. Believing themselves to be faithful to their
religion or to their science, they are only self-deluded, a clear case of
“mental suicide.”
Consider now the statement, “All knowledge rests upon a
single first principle.” (Supra.)
Why is this important?
Because, as Mortimer Adler noted in his book Ten
Philosophical Mistakes (1985), in our day and age many people have confused
knowledge (which is always true),
with opinion, which may or may not be
true. (Mortimer J. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985,
83-107.) Confusing knowledge and opinion
shifts the foundation of our understanding of our own existence — reality —
from the solid foundation of truth, to the shifting sands of expedience and
relativism.
In consequence, “truth” becomes whatever we find useful or
compatible with our chosen worldview.
Something becomes true because we believe it, rather than that we
believe it because it is true. This, as
both the solidarist political scientist Heinrich Rommen (Heinrich Rommen, The Natural Law. Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc.,
1998, 134-138) and Adler (Mortimer J. Adler, “The Nature of Natural Law,” accessed October 9, 2013) noted, paves the way for totalitarianism, even
complete nihilism. (Rommen, The Natural
Law, op. cit., 52; Cf. John Paul II, Centesimus
Annus, 1991, § 44.)
Nowhere has this reversal of what it means for something to
be true been more devastating than
among the followers of G. K. Chesterton — at least with respect to the chances
of Chesterton’s canonization any time soon.
Those participating in and producing Chestertonian arguments and
articles, books and broadsides, debates and discussions — virtually anything,
in short, that emanates from the Chestertonian Establishment — inevitably
assume at some point that something is true because they believe it, and they
believe it because they think that is what Chesterton, the Catholic Church, or
some other authority they accept on faith, said.
Why this is so terrible and terrifying an error will be the
subject of the next posting in this series.